The Regulated to Fail Policy Simulator
Can you fix the universities?
Change the rules. Run the system to 2036. See what happens.
The interactive simulator needs JavaScript. Below is what happens under current policy, as the model runs it, by 2035–36.
Illustrative: one run of the model with its central assumptions. Model 0.5.0.
Research-intensive 21
Large research-intensive university. Teaching income (tuition fees and OfS grants) of more than £200m a year, making up less than 70% of all its income. Most of the rest comes from research grants and contracts.
The big research universities, most with 20,000 to 35,000 students. Almost all are members of the Russell Group.
11 in deficit · 4 at risk
Teaching-intensive 14
Large teaching-intensive university. Teaching income of more than £200m a year, making up more than 70% of all its income: it depends on tuition fees far more than on research.
Large universities, most with 22,000 to 32,000 students. Most are former polytechnics, which became universities in 1992.
8 in deficit · 0 at risk · 1 merged · 0 closed
Medium 43
Medium-sized university. Teaching income of £100m to £200m a year.
Mid-sized universities, most with 10,000 to 20,000 students: post-1992 universities alongside smaller research universities, several of them founded in the 1960s.
20 in deficit · 3 at risk · 1 merged · 0 closed
Smaller 53
Smaller university or college. Teaching income of less than £100m a year (or not known), for a provider that is neither a specialist nor teaching mainly below degree level.
A varied group: small universities (many of which began as teacher-training or church colleges), university colleges and private providers. Most have fewer than 10,000 students and many fewer than 1,000.
18 in deficit · 9 at risk · 8 merged · 2 closed
Specialist 58
Specialist institution. At least 75% of its students in one broad subject area, or at least 90% in two, where neither is creative arts and design. Specialism is tested before size, so a specialist can be any size.
Theological and Bible colleges, medical, veterinary and health schools, business and law schools, agricultural universities and some postgraduate research institutes. Many are very small; a few are large or research-heavy.
16 in deficit · 5 at risk · 11 merged · 4 closed
Creative 45
Specialist creative institution. A specialist (at least 75% of students in one broad subject area, or 90% in two) where creative arts and design is one of the two.
Conservatoires, drama and dance schools, art and design universities, film schools and popular music colleges. Mostly small, with costly studio and small-group teaching.
10 in deficit · 7 at risk · 10 merged · 2 closed
Level 4-5 45
Level 4 and 5 provider. More than half of its higher education students are studying at Level 4 or 5, below a bachelor's degree. Level 4 is the standard of a degree's first year (such as a Higher National Certificate, HNC); Level 5 of its second (a Higher National Diploma, HND, or a foundation degree); a bachelor's degree is Level 6. This is tested first, so such a provider is in this group whatever its size or subject.
Mostly private providers, most teaching business and management, almost all to UK students. Further education colleges teach most Level 4 and 5 courses, but their finances are overseen by the Department for Education, not the OfS, so they are not in the OfS's figures or in the model.
8 in deficit · 2 at risk · 10 merged · 4 closed
Hover over or tap a building to see that provider, or . All 279 are synthetic: none is a real university.
- Financially comfortable
- In deficit
- Serious distress (low cash)
- Cannot pay its way
- Merged into another provider
- Closed
Current policy, 2035–36
No overall score: which of these matters most is your judgement. Indices are 100 in 2024–25.
Financial sustainability
Share of students at providers not in a cash crisis, whether or not in deficit
92%
Why? Financial sustainability
Each year a provider earns fees, grants and research income, pays staff and running costs, and adds what is left to its cash. A provider is in a cash crisis when its cash falls below about five weeks of spending; one with less cash than it owes pays interest on the gap. Costs rise with pay and prices; income rises only as far as fees, grants and student numbers allow. Providers in deficit cut costs, but cuts take a year or two to arrive. The gauge measures cash, not deficits: a provider in deficit with ample cash counts as secure, and students of providers that have closed are no longer counted (see "Students who lost their place").
The assumptions it rests on most
- Low liquidity threshold10% of annual expenditureAccountingSources and range for Low liquidity threshold →
- Interest above Bank Rate on short-term borrowing by providers with negative net liquidity0.03 annual rate above Bank RateAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Interest above Bank Rate on short-term borrowing by providers with negative net liquidity →
- Future national pay awards relative to inflationin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Future national pay awards relative to inflation →
- Pay drift (incremental progression net of staff turnover)0.5% a yearAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Pay drift (incremental progression net of staff turnover) →
- Real growth in non-pay costsin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Real growth in non-pay costs →
- Real growth in international feesin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Real growth in international fees →
- Consecutive deficit years before a provider starts restructuring2 yearsMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Consecutive deficit years before a provider starts restructuring →
- Staff lost each year to a recruitment freeze2% of staff a yearMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Staff lost each year to a recruitment freeze →
- Staff leaving in one voluntary severance programme3% of staffMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Staff leaving in one voluntary severance programme →
- Capital spending of a provider under pressure, relative to normal73%Measured · moderate evidenceSources and range for Capital spending of a provider under pressure, relative to normal →
Student experience
Staffing and estate, 2024–25 = 100
93
Why? Student experience
Student experience follows the number of students per member of staff and the state of the buildings, with a lag of about two years. Recruitment freezes, severance and compulsory cuts raise the ratio; deferred capital spending builds a maintenance backlog. Providers that recover hire back. This is the model's least evidenced link: there is no robust estimate of how much class sizes change the experience of studying.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Response of student experience to the student-staff ratio0.5 elasticityAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Response of student experience to the student-staff ratio →
- Response of student experience to the condition of the estate0.3 elasticityAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Response of student experience to the condition of the estate →
- Time for student experience to respond to resources2 yearsAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Time for student experience to respond to resources →
- Staff lost each year to a recruitment freeze2% of staff a yearMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Staff lost each year to a recruitment freeze →
- Compulsory staff reduction in a liquidity crisis5% of teaching staffAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Compulsory staff reduction in a liquidity crisis →
Research capacity
Research activity, 2024–25 = 100
92
Why? Research capacity
Research loses money: grants cover about 70 per cent of its full cost at research-intensive universities, and the rest is paid from surpluses, mostly on international fees. Providers in trouble cut research, which saves money at once; the research funding that depends on quality (QR) falls only after REF 2029. Severance schemes also take research staff.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Research activity cut in one round10% of research activityAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Research activity cut in one round →
- Share of full economic cost paid on a UKRI grant80% of full economic costAccountingSources and range for Share of full economic cost paid on a UKRI grant →
- Response of QR funding to research standing at the REF1 elasticityAssumption · moderate evidenceSources and range for Response of QR funding to research standing at the REF →
- First academic year funded on REF 2029 results2030–31AccountingSources and range for First academic year funded on REF 2029 results →
- Time for research standing to respond to research activity4 yearsAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Time for research standing to respond to research activity →
Subject breadth
Courses still offered, 2024–25 = 100
95
Why? Subject breadth
Providers still in deficit after three years close low-enrolment courses. Closures fall on the subjects English providers have actually withdrawn most often since 2019 — languages, geography, agriculture and combined studies — and least on law, medicine, nursing and social work. Closed providers take their courses with them.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Course provision lost by one round of closures6% of provisionAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Course provision lost by one round of closures →
- Students lost by one round of course closures1.5% of studentsAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Students lost by one round of course closures →
- Staff cost removed by one round of course closures4% of teaching staffAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Staff cost removed by one round of course closures →
- Years between restructuring programmes at a provider still in deficit3 yearsMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Years between restructuring programmes at a provider still in deficit →
Regional access
Home students at each region’s providers against its 18-year-olds, 2024–25 = 100
100
Why? Regional access
Home students at each region's providers are compared with what the region's 2024-25 places would be with England's changing number of 18-year-olds, and the regions are averaged. It counts places by where providers are, not where students live or how far they travel. When a provider closes, about half its continuing home students finish their courses nearby and most of its future applicants go to other providers, within those providers' capacity; the rest are lost to higher education. Mergers keep the places.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Home applicants who would have gone to a closed provider and enrol elsewhere instead75%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Home applicants who would have gone to a closed provider and enrol elsewhere instead →
- Most extra students a provider can take from closed providers20% of its own studentsAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Most extra students a provider can take from closed providers →
- Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere50%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere →
- Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way-30 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way →
- Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner50% chance a yearAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner →
- Liquidity a provider needs to take over another120 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Liquidity a provider needs to take over another →
- Years a provider can remain unable to pay its way before it closes2 yearsAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Years a provider can remain unable to pay its way before it closes →
Public cost
Selected: grants, research funding and the expected loss on fee loans, less the levy, in 2024–25 prices
£9.0bn
Why? Public cost
A selected public cost, not the whole fiscal effect: the teaching grant and other funding body grants, research (QR and research council grants), and the expected long-run loss on new home fee loans (about a third of what is lent, an average rate rather than the cost of an extra pound lent), less levy receipts — in 2024–25 prices. The loan line is not cash spent that year. A higher fee cap raises the loan cost; abolishing the levy loses its receipts; paying research its full cost raises grants. If fees are abolished, the whole fee is a grant. Extra maintenance grants, capital funding and payments to move students from closed providers are counted; existing maintenance support, VAT, National Insurance and visa receipts are not, so policies that change those look cheaper or dearer than they are.
| Line | Current policy |
|---|---|
| OfS teaching grant | £1.00bn |
| Other funding body grants | £0.92bn |
| QR research funding | £1.95bn |
| Research council grants | £2.07bn |
| Expected loss on new fee loans | £3.51bn |
| Levy receipts | −£0.39bn |
| Cash spent in the year | £5.94bn |
| Public costCash spent, plus the expected loss on new loans, less the levy | £9.05bn |
The assumptions it rests on most
- Share of student loan outlay not expected to be repaid (RAB charge)33% of outlayMeasured · strong evidenceSources and range for Share of student loan outlay not expected to be repaid (RAB charge) →
- Share of home undergraduate fee income paid through student loans85% of fee incomeAccountingSources and range for Share of home undergraduate fee income paid through student loans →
- Share of home undergraduates eligible for a maintenance grant40% of home undergraduatesMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Share of home undergraduates eligible for a maintenance grant →
- Share of full economic cost paid on a UKRI grant80% of full economic costAccountingSources and range for Share of full economic cost paid on a UKRI grant →
| Figure | Current policy |
|---|---|
| Providers in deficitIndependent providers | 91 |
| In deficit three years runningIndependent providers | 37 |
| At serious riskLow cash, or unable to pay their way | 30 |
| Merged since 2024–25Absorbed by another provider | 41 |
| Closed since 2024–25Gone, with some students moving elsewhere | 12 |
| Students who lost their placeContinuing students of closed providers not placed elsewhere, since 2024–25 (FTE) | 2,435 |
| Home studentsFull-time equivalent | 1,578,000 |
| International studentsFull-time equivalent | 491,000 |
| Public-service studentsStudents now on medicine, nursing, health, teacher-training and social-work courses (all levels and domiciles), 2024–25 = 100 | 102 |
Why? The supporting figures
Providers in deficit
A provider is in deficit when this year's costs exceed its income (excluding one-off pension accounting). In the model, pay and prices grow faster than fees and grants for most of the decade, so deficits return after providers' first round of cuts. Year-to-year swings in recruitment and one-off costs, measured from ten years of real accounts, move providers in and out of deficit.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Future national pay awards relative to inflationin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Future national pay awards relative to inflation →
- Pay drift (incremental progression net of staff turnover)0.5% a yearAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Pay drift (incremental progression net of staff turnover) →
- Real growth in non-pay costsin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Real growth in non-pay costs →
- Real growth in international feesin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Real growth in international fees →
- Year-to-year variation in a provider's recruitment5.1% a year (standard deviation)Measured · moderate evidenceSources and range for Year-to-year variation in a provider's recruitment →
- One-off items in a provider's accounts each year2.4% of income (standard deviation)Measured · moderate evidenceSources and range for One-off items in a provider's accounts each year →
- Consecutive deficit years before a provider starts restructuring2 yearsMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Consecutive deficit years before a provider starts restructuring →
- Staff lost each year to a recruitment freeze2% of staff a yearMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Staff lost each year to a recruitment freeze →
- Staff leaving in one voluntary severance programme3% of staffMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Staff leaving in one voluntary severance programme →
- Capital spending of a provider under pressure, relative to normal73%Measured · moderate evidenceSources and range for Capital spending of a provider under pressure, relative to normal →
In deficit three years running
Independent providers whose costs have exceeded their income for at least three years in a row, including years before 2024-25. A deficit run can be survived for a while on cash, so this shows strain that the financial sustainability gauge, which measures cash, does not.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Future national pay awards relative to inflationin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Future national pay awards relative to inflation →
- Pay drift (incremental progression net of staff turnover)0.5% a yearAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Pay drift (incremental progression net of staff turnover) →
- Real growth in non-pay costsin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Real growth in non-pay costs →
- Real growth in international feesin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Real growth in international fees →
- Consecutive deficit years before a provider starts restructuring2 yearsMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Consecutive deficit years before a provider starts restructuring →
- Providers in deficit in 2024-25 that were also in deficit in 2023-2465.2%Measured · strong evidenceSources and range for Providers in deficit in 2024-25 that were also in deficit in 2023-24 →
- Providers in deficit in 2024-25, 2023-24 and 2022-2348.3%Measured · strong evidenceSources and range for Providers in deficit in 2024-25, 2023-24 and 2022-23 →
At serious risk
Providers whose cash has fallen below 10 per cent of a year's spending (the OfS's low-liquidity measure), or who can no longer pay their way. Asset sales and compulsory cuts slow the fall; mergers and closures remove providers from the count.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Low liquidity threshold10% of annual expenditureAccountingSources and range for Low liquidity threshold →
- Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way-30 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way →
- Cash raised by selling assets5% of annual incomeAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Cash raised by selling assets →
- Compulsory staff reduction in a liquidity crisis5% of teaching staffAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Compulsory staff reduction in a liquidity crisis →
Merged since 2024–25
A provider that cannot pay its way looks for a partner with ample cash, preferably in its own region. Only some searches succeed in any year. The absorbed provider keeps teaching as part of its partner, whose cash takes on its shortfall.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner50% chance a yearAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner →
- Liquidity a provider needs to take over another120 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Liquidity a provider needs to take over another →
- Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way-30 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way →
- Saving from merging, once integrated5% of the absorbed provider's staff and other costsAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Saving from merging, once integrated →
Closed since 2024–25
With no partner willing, a provider that stays unable to pay its way for two years closes. England has no special administration regime for universities, so how long lenders, the OfS and government would let one continue is untested; the model's answer is an assumption, not a prediction of which or how many providers would close.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Years a provider can remain unable to pay its way before it closes2 yearsAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Years a provider can remain unable to pay its way before it closes →
- Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner50% chance a yearAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner →
- Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way-30 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way →
- Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere50%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere →
Students who lost their place
When a provider closes, its final-year students finish and its continuing students need new places. Some are placed — at providers in the same region first, then elsewhere, each taking no more than a set share of its own students — and finish their courses there; the rest lose their place. A restructuring regime places more. Students counted here are cumulative since 2024-25, in full-time equivalents.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere50%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere →
- Continuing international students of a closed provider who finish their courses at another English provider25%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Continuing international students of a closed provider who finish their courses at another English provider →
- Most extra students a provider can take from closed providers20% of its own studentsAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Most extra students a provider can take from closed providers →
- Restructuring regime: home students moved when a provider closes85%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Restructuring regime: home students moved when a provider closes →
- Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way-30 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way →
- Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner50% chance a yearAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner →
- Liquidity a provider needs to take over another120 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Liquidity a provider needs to take over another →
- Years a provider can remain unable to pay its way before it closes2 yearsAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Years a provider can remain unable to pay its way before it closes →
Home students
Each year's home undergraduate intake follows that year's 18-year-olds, which peak around 2030, and stays for the length of the course; taught and research postgraduates are recruited separately, so undergraduate policies (maintenance grants, caps, cuts in places) do not move them. Fees do not change home demand in the model (England's 2012 tripling barely did). Providers' reputations, their course closures and closed providers' students and applicants shift numbers between providers.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Response of home undergraduate numbers to the 18-year-old population1 elasticityAssumption · moderate evidenceSources and range for Response of home undergraduate numbers to the 18-year-old population →
- Home undergraduate demand: response to the fee cap0 % change in entrants per % change in real feeMeasured · moderate evidenceSources and range for Home undergraduate demand: response to the fee cap →
- Response of home recruitment to reputation0.5 elasticityMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Response of home recruitment to reputation →
- Home applicants who would have gone to a closed provider and enrol elsewhere instead75%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Home applicants who would have gone to a closed provider and enrol elsewhere instead →
- Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere50%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere →
International students
International entrants respond to the Graduate Route, the dependants rule, fees (including the share of the levy passed on to students) and providers' reputations, then stay for the length of their course. Providers in trouble push recruitment, but most of what they gain comes from other English providers.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Effect on international entrants of abolishing the Graduate Route-0.15 proportional change in taught entrantsMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Effect on international entrants of abolishing the Graduate Route →
- Effect on international entrants of extending the Graduate Route to 36 months0.05 proportional change in taught entrantsMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Effect on international entrants of extending the Graduate Route to 36 months →
- Effect on international taught postgraduate entrants of allowing dependants again0.08 proportional change in taught postgraduate entrantsMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Effect on international taught postgraduate entrants of allowing dependants again →
- International postgraduate demand: short-run price elasticity-0.81 % change in entrants per % change in feesMeasured · moderate evidenceSources and range for International postgraduate demand: short-run price elasticity →
- Share of the levy passed on in higher international fees90% of the levy per studentAssumption · moderate evidenceSources and range for Share of the levy passed on in higher international fees →
- Response of international recruitment to reputation1 elasticityAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Response of international recruitment to reputation →
- Share of extra international recruits who would not otherwise have come to England50%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Share of extra international recruits who would not otherwise have come to England →
Public-service students
Students in medicine, nursing and midwifery, health professions, teacher training and social work. They change with student numbers, with providers closing, and with course closures — which fall on these subjects least, because providers have rarely withdrawn them.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Course provision lost by one round of closures6% of provisionAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Course provision lost by one round of closures →
- Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere50%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere →
- Response of home undergraduate numbers to the 18-year-old population1 elasticityAssumption · moderate evidenceSources and range for Response of home undergraduate numbers to the 18-year-old population →
Ten years at a glance
How each figure moves from 2026–27 to 2035–36 under current policy.
- 2 improving
- 8 getting worse
- 3 broadly steady
- 2 changing, not judged better or worse
- Financial sustainabilityShare of students at providers not in a cash crisis, whether or not in deficit
2035–36 92%
Falling: 97% in 2026–27, 92% in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- Student experienceStaffing and estate, 2024–25 = 100
2035–36 93
Falling: 98 in 2026–27, 93 in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- Research capacityResearch activity, 2024–25 = 100
2035–36 92
Falling: 98 in 2026–27, 92 in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- Subject breadthCourses still offered, 2024–25 = 100
2035–36 95
Falling: 99 in 2026–27, 95 in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- Regional accessHome students at each region’s providers against its 18-year-olds, 2024–25 = 100
2035–36 100
Steady: 101 in 2026–27, 100 in 2035–36, little overall change.
- Public costSelected: grants, research funding and the expected loss on fee loans, less the levy, in 2024–25 prices
2035–36 £9.0bn
Falling: £10.0bn in 2026–27, £9.0bn in 2035–36, not judged better or worse.
- Providers in deficitIndependent providers
2035–36 91
Rising, unevenly: 78 in 2026–27, 91 in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- In deficit three years runningIndependent providers
2035–36 37
Falling: 52 in 2026–27, 37 in 2035–36, an improvement.
- At serious riskLow cash, or unable to pay their way
2035–36 30
Falling: 46 in 2026–27, 30 in 2035–36, an improvement.
- Merged since 2024–25Absorbed by another provider
2035–36 41
Rising: 1 in 2026–27, 41 in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- Closed since 2024–25Gone, with some students moving elsewhere
2035–36 12
Rising: 0 in 2026–27, 12 in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- Students who lost their placeContinuing students of closed providers not placed elsewhere, since 2024–25 (FTE)
2035–36 2,435
Rising: 0 in 2026–27, 2,435 in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- Home studentsFull-time equivalent
2035–36 1,578,000
Up and down: 1,586,000 in 2026–27, 1,578,000 in 2035–36, little overall change.
- International studentsFull-time equivalent
2035–36 491,000
Falling: 519,000 in 2026–27, 491,000 in 2035–36, not judged better or worse.
- Public-service studentsStudents now on medicine, nursing, health, teacher-training and social-work courses (all levels and domiciles), 2024–25 = 100
2035–36 102
Steady: 103 in 2026–27, 102 in 2035–36, little overall change.
Show the numbers, year by year
| Figure | 2026–27 | 2027–28 | 2028–29 | 2029–30 | 2030–31 | 2031–32 | 2032–33 | 2033–34 | 2034–35 | 2035–36 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial sustainabilityShare of students at providers not in a cash crisis, whether or not in deficit | 97% | 98% | 96% | 92% | 92% | 94% | 93% | 91% | 91% | 92% |
| Student experienceStaffing and estate, 2024–25 = 100 | 98 | 97 | 96 | 96 | 96 | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 93 |
| Research capacityResearch activity, 2024–25 = 100 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 97 | 96 | 95 | 94 | 93 | 92 |
| Subject breadthCourses still offered, 2024–25 = 100 | 99 | 99 | 99 | 98 | 98 | 97 | 97 | 96 | 95 | 95 |
| Regional accessHome students at each region’s providers against its 18-year-olds, 2024–25 = 100 | 101 | 101 | 101 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Public costSelected: grants, research funding and the expected loss on fee loans, less the levy, in 2024–25 prices | £10.0bn | £10.0bn | £9.6bn | £9.6bn | £9.6bn | £9.5bn | £9.5bn | £9.3bn | £9.2bn | £9.0bn |
| Providers in deficitIndependent providers | 78 | 75 | 83 | 65 | 72 | 72 | 73 | 80 | 77 | 91 |
| In deficit three years runningIndependent providers | 52 | 36 | 35 | 29 | 34 | 33 | 33 | 28 | 34 | 37 |
| At serious riskLow cash, or unable to pay their way | 46 | 39 | 37 | 35 | 36 | 39 | 37 | 33 | 28 | 30 |
| Merged since 2024–25Absorbed by another provider | 1 | 3 | 8 | 13 | 16 | 17 | 21 | 28 | 33 | 41 |
| Closed since 2024–25Gone, with some students moving elsewhere | 0 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 12 |
| Students who lost their placeContinuing students of closed providers not placed elsewhere, since 2024–25 (FTE) | 0 | 0 | 402 | 1,646 | 1,646 | 1,646 | 1,646 | 1,813 | 2,108 | 2,435 |
| Home studentsFull-time equivalent | 1,586,000 | 1,607,000 | 1,624,000 | 1,636,000 | 1,652,000 | 1,662,000 | 1,660,000 | 1,641,000 | 1,613,000 | 1,578,000 |
| International studentsFull-time equivalent | 519,000 | 511,000 | 496,000 | 491,000 | 489,000 | 492,000 | 493,000 | 496,000 | 495,000 | 491,000 |
| Public-service studentsStudents now on medicine, nursing, health, teacher-training and social-work courses (all levels and domiciles), 2024–25 = 100 | 103 | 103 | 104 | 104 | 105 | 106 | 106 | 106 | 104 | 102 |
The interactive simulator needs JavaScript. Below is what happens under current policy, as the model runs it, by 2035–36.
Illustrative: one run of the model with its central assumptions. Model 0.5.0.
Research-intensive 21
Large research-intensive university. Teaching income (tuition fees and OfS grants) of more than £200m a year, making up less than 70% of all its income. Most of the rest comes from research grants and contracts.
The big research universities, most with 20,000 to 35,000 students. Almost all are members of the Russell Group.
11 in deficit · 4 at risk
Teaching-intensive 14
Large teaching-intensive university. Teaching income of more than £200m a year, making up more than 70% of all its income: it depends on tuition fees far more than on research.
Large universities, most with 22,000 to 32,000 students. Most are former polytechnics, which became universities in 1992.
8 in deficit · 0 at risk · 1 merged · 0 closed
Medium 43
Medium-sized university. Teaching income of £100m to £200m a year.
Mid-sized universities, most with 10,000 to 20,000 students: post-1992 universities alongside smaller research universities, several of them founded in the 1960s.
20 in deficit · 3 at risk · 1 merged · 0 closed
Smaller 53
Smaller university or college. Teaching income of less than £100m a year (or not known), for a provider that is neither a specialist nor teaching mainly below degree level.
A varied group: small universities (many of which began as teacher-training or church colleges), university colleges and private providers. Most have fewer than 10,000 students and many fewer than 1,000.
18 in deficit · 9 at risk · 8 merged · 2 closed
Specialist 58
Specialist institution. At least 75% of its students in one broad subject area, or at least 90% in two, where neither is creative arts and design. Specialism is tested before size, so a specialist can be any size.
Theological and Bible colleges, medical, veterinary and health schools, business and law schools, agricultural universities and some postgraduate research institutes. Many are very small; a few are large or research-heavy.
16 in deficit · 5 at risk · 11 merged · 4 closed
Creative 45
Specialist creative institution. A specialist (at least 75% of students in one broad subject area, or 90% in two) where creative arts and design is one of the two.
Conservatoires, drama and dance schools, art and design universities, film schools and popular music colleges. Mostly small, with costly studio and small-group teaching.
10 in deficit · 7 at risk · 10 merged · 2 closed
Level 4-5 45
Level 4 and 5 provider. More than half of its higher education students are studying at Level 4 or 5, below a bachelor's degree. Level 4 is the standard of a degree's first year (such as a Higher National Certificate, HNC); Level 5 of its second (a Higher National Diploma, HND, or a foundation degree); a bachelor's degree is Level 6. This is tested first, so such a provider is in this group whatever its size or subject.
Mostly private providers, most teaching business and management, almost all to UK students. Further education colleges teach most Level 4 and 5 courses, but their finances are overseen by the Department for Education, not the OfS, so they are not in the OfS's figures or in the model.
8 in deficit · 2 at risk · 10 merged · 4 closed
Hover over or tap a building to see that provider, or . All 279 are synthetic: none is a real university.
- Financially comfortable
- In deficit
- Serious distress (low cash)
- Cannot pay its way
- Merged into another provider
- Closed
Current policy, 2035–36
No overall score: which of these matters most is your judgement. Indices are 100 in 2024–25.
Financial sustainability
Share of students at providers not in a cash crisis, whether or not in deficit
92%
Why? Financial sustainability
Each year a provider earns fees, grants and research income, pays staff and running costs, and adds what is left to its cash. A provider is in a cash crisis when its cash falls below about five weeks of spending; one with less cash than it owes pays interest on the gap. Costs rise with pay and prices; income rises only as far as fees, grants and student numbers allow. Providers in deficit cut costs, but cuts take a year or two to arrive. The gauge measures cash, not deficits: a provider in deficit with ample cash counts as secure, and students of providers that have closed are no longer counted (see "Students who lost their place").
The assumptions it rests on most
- Low liquidity threshold10% of annual expenditureAccountingSources and range for Low liquidity threshold →
- Interest above Bank Rate on short-term borrowing by providers with negative net liquidity0.03 annual rate above Bank RateAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Interest above Bank Rate on short-term borrowing by providers with negative net liquidity →
- Future national pay awards relative to inflationin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Future national pay awards relative to inflation →
- Pay drift (incremental progression net of staff turnover)0.5% a yearAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Pay drift (incremental progression net of staff turnover) →
- Real growth in non-pay costsin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Real growth in non-pay costs →
- Real growth in international feesin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Real growth in international fees →
- Consecutive deficit years before a provider starts restructuring2 yearsMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Consecutive deficit years before a provider starts restructuring →
- Staff lost each year to a recruitment freeze2% of staff a yearMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Staff lost each year to a recruitment freeze →
- Staff leaving in one voluntary severance programme3% of staffMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Staff leaving in one voluntary severance programme →
- Capital spending of a provider under pressure, relative to normal73%Measured · moderate evidenceSources and range for Capital spending of a provider under pressure, relative to normal →
Student experience
Staffing and estate, 2024–25 = 100
93
Why? Student experience
Student experience follows the number of students per member of staff and the state of the buildings, with a lag of about two years. Recruitment freezes, severance and compulsory cuts raise the ratio; deferred capital spending builds a maintenance backlog. Providers that recover hire back. This is the model's least evidenced link: there is no robust estimate of how much class sizes change the experience of studying.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Response of student experience to the student-staff ratio0.5 elasticityAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Response of student experience to the student-staff ratio →
- Response of student experience to the condition of the estate0.3 elasticityAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Response of student experience to the condition of the estate →
- Time for student experience to respond to resources2 yearsAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Time for student experience to respond to resources →
- Staff lost each year to a recruitment freeze2% of staff a yearMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Staff lost each year to a recruitment freeze →
- Compulsory staff reduction in a liquidity crisis5% of teaching staffAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Compulsory staff reduction in a liquidity crisis →
Research capacity
Research activity, 2024–25 = 100
92
Why? Research capacity
Research loses money: grants cover about 70 per cent of its full cost at research-intensive universities, and the rest is paid from surpluses, mostly on international fees. Providers in trouble cut research, which saves money at once; the research funding that depends on quality (QR) falls only after REF 2029. Severance schemes also take research staff.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Research activity cut in one round10% of research activityAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Research activity cut in one round →
- Share of full economic cost paid on a UKRI grant80% of full economic costAccountingSources and range for Share of full economic cost paid on a UKRI grant →
- Response of QR funding to research standing at the REF1 elasticityAssumption · moderate evidenceSources and range for Response of QR funding to research standing at the REF →
- First academic year funded on REF 2029 results2030–31AccountingSources and range for First academic year funded on REF 2029 results →
- Time for research standing to respond to research activity4 yearsAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Time for research standing to respond to research activity →
Subject breadth
Courses still offered, 2024–25 = 100
95
Why? Subject breadth
Providers still in deficit after three years close low-enrolment courses. Closures fall on the subjects English providers have actually withdrawn most often since 2019 — languages, geography, agriculture and combined studies — and least on law, medicine, nursing and social work. Closed providers take their courses with them.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Course provision lost by one round of closures6% of provisionAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Course provision lost by one round of closures →
- Students lost by one round of course closures1.5% of studentsAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Students lost by one round of course closures →
- Staff cost removed by one round of course closures4% of teaching staffAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Staff cost removed by one round of course closures →
- Years between restructuring programmes at a provider still in deficit3 yearsMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Years between restructuring programmes at a provider still in deficit →
Regional access
Home students at each region’s providers against its 18-year-olds, 2024–25 = 100
100
Why? Regional access
Home students at each region's providers are compared with what the region's 2024-25 places would be with England's changing number of 18-year-olds, and the regions are averaged. It counts places by where providers are, not where students live or how far they travel. When a provider closes, about half its continuing home students finish their courses nearby and most of its future applicants go to other providers, within those providers' capacity; the rest are lost to higher education. Mergers keep the places.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Home applicants who would have gone to a closed provider and enrol elsewhere instead75%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Home applicants who would have gone to a closed provider and enrol elsewhere instead →
- Most extra students a provider can take from closed providers20% of its own studentsAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Most extra students a provider can take from closed providers →
- Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere50%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere →
- Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way-30 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way →
- Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner50% chance a yearAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner →
- Liquidity a provider needs to take over another120 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Liquidity a provider needs to take over another →
- Years a provider can remain unable to pay its way before it closes2 yearsAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Years a provider can remain unable to pay its way before it closes →
Public cost
Selected: grants, research funding and the expected loss on fee loans, less the levy, in 2024–25 prices
£9.0bn
Why? Public cost
A selected public cost, not the whole fiscal effect: the teaching grant and other funding body grants, research (QR and research council grants), and the expected long-run loss on new home fee loans (about a third of what is lent, an average rate rather than the cost of an extra pound lent), less levy receipts — in 2024–25 prices. The loan line is not cash spent that year. A higher fee cap raises the loan cost; abolishing the levy loses its receipts; paying research its full cost raises grants. If fees are abolished, the whole fee is a grant. Extra maintenance grants, capital funding and payments to move students from closed providers are counted; existing maintenance support, VAT, National Insurance and visa receipts are not, so policies that change those look cheaper or dearer than they are.
| Line | Current policy |
|---|---|
| OfS teaching grant | £1.00bn |
| Other funding body grants | £0.92bn |
| QR research funding | £1.95bn |
| Research council grants | £2.07bn |
| Expected loss on new fee loans | £3.51bn |
| Levy receipts | −£0.39bn |
| Cash spent in the year | £5.94bn |
| Public costCash spent, plus the expected loss on new loans, less the levy | £9.05bn |
The assumptions it rests on most
- Share of student loan outlay not expected to be repaid (RAB charge)33% of outlayMeasured · strong evidenceSources and range for Share of student loan outlay not expected to be repaid (RAB charge) →
- Share of home undergraduate fee income paid through student loans85% of fee incomeAccountingSources and range for Share of home undergraduate fee income paid through student loans →
- Share of home undergraduates eligible for a maintenance grant40% of home undergraduatesMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Share of home undergraduates eligible for a maintenance grant →
- Share of full economic cost paid on a UKRI grant80% of full economic costAccountingSources and range for Share of full economic cost paid on a UKRI grant →
| Figure | Current policy |
|---|---|
| Providers in deficitIndependent providers | 91 |
| In deficit three years runningIndependent providers | 37 |
| At serious riskLow cash, or unable to pay their way | 30 |
| Merged since 2024–25Absorbed by another provider | 41 |
| Closed since 2024–25Gone, with some students moving elsewhere | 12 |
| Students who lost their placeContinuing students of closed providers not placed elsewhere, since 2024–25 (FTE) | 2,435 |
| Home studentsFull-time equivalent | 1,578,000 |
| International studentsFull-time equivalent | 491,000 |
| Public-service studentsStudents now on medicine, nursing, health, teacher-training and social-work courses (all levels and domiciles), 2024–25 = 100 | 102 |
Why? The supporting figures
Providers in deficit
A provider is in deficit when this year's costs exceed its income (excluding one-off pension accounting). In the model, pay and prices grow faster than fees and grants for most of the decade, so deficits return after providers' first round of cuts. Year-to-year swings in recruitment and one-off costs, measured from ten years of real accounts, move providers in and out of deficit.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Future national pay awards relative to inflationin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Future national pay awards relative to inflation →
- Pay drift (incremental progression net of staff turnover)0.5% a yearAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Pay drift (incremental progression net of staff turnover) →
- Real growth in non-pay costsin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Real growth in non-pay costs →
- Real growth in international feesin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Real growth in international fees →
- Year-to-year variation in a provider's recruitment5.1% a year (standard deviation)Measured · moderate evidenceSources and range for Year-to-year variation in a provider's recruitment →
- One-off items in a provider's accounts each year2.4% of income (standard deviation)Measured · moderate evidenceSources and range for One-off items in a provider's accounts each year →
- Consecutive deficit years before a provider starts restructuring2 yearsMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Consecutive deficit years before a provider starts restructuring →
- Staff lost each year to a recruitment freeze2% of staff a yearMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Staff lost each year to a recruitment freeze →
- Staff leaving in one voluntary severance programme3% of staffMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Staff leaving in one voluntary severance programme →
- Capital spending of a provider under pressure, relative to normal73%Measured · moderate evidenceSources and range for Capital spending of a provider under pressure, relative to normal →
In deficit three years running
Independent providers whose costs have exceeded their income for at least three years in a row, including years before 2024-25. A deficit run can be survived for a while on cash, so this shows strain that the financial sustainability gauge, which measures cash, does not.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Future national pay awards relative to inflationin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Future national pay awards relative to inflation →
- Pay drift (incremental progression net of staff turnover)0.5% a yearAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Pay drift (incremental progression net of staff turnover) →
- Real growth in non-pay costsin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Real growth in non-pay costs →
- Real growth in international feesin line with CPIAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Real growth in international fees →
- Consecutive deficit years before a provider starts restructuring2 yearsMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Consecutive deficit years before a provider starts restructuring →
- Providers in deficit in 2024-25 that were also in deficit in 2023-2465.2%Measured · strong evidenceSources and range for Providers in deficit in 2024-25 that were also in deficit in 2023-24 →
- Providers in deficit in 2024-25, 2023-24 and 2022-2348.3%Measured · strong evidenceSources and range for Providers in deficit in 2024-25, 2023-24 and 2022-23 →
At serious risk
Providers whose cash has fallen below 10 per cent of a year's spending (the OfS's low-liquidity measure), or who can no longer pay their way. Asset sales and compulsory cuts slow the fall; mergers and closures remove providers from the count.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Low liquidity threshold10% of annual expenditureAccountingSources and range for Low liquidity threshold →
- Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way-30 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way →
- Cash raised by selling assets5% of annual incomeAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Cash raised by selling assets →
- Compulsory staff reduction in a liquidity crisis5% of teaching staffAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Compulsory staff reduction in a liquidity crisis →
Merged since 2024–25
A provider that cannot pay its way looks for a partner with ample cash, preferably in its own region. Only some searches succeed in any year. The absorbed provider keeps teaching as part of its partner, whose cash takes on its shortfall.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner50% chance a yearAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner →
- Liquidity a provider needs to take over another120 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Liquidity a provider needs to take over another →
- Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way-30 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way →
- Saving from merging, once integrated5% of the absorbed provider's staff and other costsAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Saving from merging, once integrated →
Closed since 2024–25
With no partner willing, a provider that stays unable to pay its way for two years closes. England has no special administration regime for universities, so how long lenders, the OfS and government would let one continue is untested; the model's answer is an assumption, not a prediction of which or how many providers would close.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Years a provider can remain unable to pay its way before it closes2 yearsAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Years a provider can remain unable to pay its way before it closes →
- Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner50% chance a yearAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner →
- Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way-30 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way →
- Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere50%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere →
Students who lost their place
When a provider closes, its final-year students finish and its continuing students need new places. Some are placed — at providers in the same region first, then elsewhere, each taking no more than a set share of its own students — and finish their courses there; the rest lose their place. A restructuring regime places more. Students counted here are cumulative since 2024-25, in full-time equivalents.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere50%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere →
- Continuing international students of a closed provider who finish their courses at another English provider25%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Continuing international students of a closed provider who finish their courses at another English provider →
- Most extra students a provider can take from closed providers20% of its own studentsAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Most extra students a provider can take from closed providers →
- Restructuring regime: home students moved when a provider closes85%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Restructuring regime: home students moved when a provider closes →
- Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way-30 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Net liquidity at which a provider can no longer pay its way →
- Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner50% chance a yearAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Chance each year that a provider in trouble finds a willing partner →
- Liquidity a provider needs to take over another120 days of spendingAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Liquidity a provider needs to take over another →
- Years a provider can remain unable to pay its way before it closes2 yearsAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Years a provider can remain unable to pay its way before it closes →
Home students
Each year's home undergraduate intake follows that year's 18-year-olds, which peak around 2030, and stays for the length of the course; taught and research postgraduates are recruited separately, so undergraduate policies (maintenance grants, caps, cuts in places) do not move them. Fees do not change home demand in the model (England's 2012 tripling barely did). Providers' reputations, their course closures and closed providers' students and applicants shift numbers between providers.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Response of home undergraduate numbers to the 18-year-old population1 elasticityAssumption · moderate evidenceSources and range for Response of home undergraduate numbers to the 18-year-old population →
- Home undergraduate demand: response to the fee cap0 % change in entrants per % change in real feeMeasured · moderate evidenceSources and range for Home undergraduate demand: response to the fee cap →
- Response of home recruitment to reputation0.5 elasticityMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Response of home recruitment to reputation →
- Home applicants who would have gone to a closed provider and enrol elsewhere instead75%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Home applicants who would have gone to a closed provider and enrol elsewhere instead →
- Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere50%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere →
International students
International entrants respond to the Graduate Route, the dependants rule, fees (including the share of the levy passed on to students) and providers' reputations, then stay for the length of their course. Providers in trouble push recruitment, but most of what they gain comes from other English providers.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Effect on international entrants of abolishing the Graduate Route-0.15 proportional change in taught entrantsMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Effect on international entrants of abolishing the Graduate Route →
- Effect on international entrants of extending the Graduate Route to 36 months0.05 proportional change in taught entrantsMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Effect on international entrants of extending the Graduate Route to 36 months →
- Effect on international taught postgraduate entrants of allowing dependants again0.08 proportional change in taught postgraduate entrantsMeasured · weak evidenceSources and range for Effect on international taught postgraduate entrants of allowing dependants again →
- International postgraduate demand: short-run price elasticity-0.81 % change in entrants per % change in feesMeasured · moderate evidenceSources and range for International postgraduate demand: short-run price elasticity →
- Share of the levy passed on in higher international fees90% of the levy per studentAssumption · moderate evidenceSources and range for Share of the levy passed on in higher international fees →
- Response of international recruitment to reputation1 elasticityAssumption · weak evidenceSources and range for Response of international recruitment to reputation →
- Share of extra international recruits who would not otherwise have come to England50%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Share of extra international recruits who would not otherwise have come to England →
Public-service students
Students in medicine, nursing and midwifery, health professions, teacher training and social work. They change with student numbers, with providers closing, and with course closures — which fall on these subjects least, because providers have rarely withdrawn them.
The assumptions it rests on most
- Course provision lost by one round of closures6% of provisionAssumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Course provision lost by one round of closures →
- Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere50%Assumption · no direct evidenceSources and range for Continuing home students of a closed provider who finish their courses elsewhere →
- Response of home undergraduate numbers to the 18-year-old population1 elasticityAssumption · moderate evidenceSources and range for Response of home undergraduate numbers to the 18-year-old population →
Ten years at a glance
How each figure moves from 2026–27 to 2035–36 under current policy.
- 2 improving
- 8 getting worse
- 3 broadly steady
- 2 changing, not judged better or worse
- Financial sustainabilityShare of students at providers not in a cash crisis, whether or not in deficit
2035–36 92%
Falling: 97% in 2026–27, 92% in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- Student experienceStaffing and estate, 2024–25 = 100
2035–36 93
Falling: 98 in 2026–27, 93 in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- Research capacityResearch activity, 2024–25 = 100
2035–36 92
Falling: 98 in 2026–27, 92 in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- Subject breadthCourses still offered, 2024–25 = 100
2035–36 95
Falling: 99 in 2026–27, 95 in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- Regional accessHome students at each region’s providers against its 18-year-olds, 2024–25 = 100
2035–36 100
Steady: 101 in 2026–27, 100 in 2035–36, little overall change.
- Public costSelected: grants, research funding and the expected loss on fee loans, less the levy, in 2024–25 prices
2035–36 £9.0bn
Falling: £10.0bn in 2026–27, £9.0bn in 2035–36, not judged better or worse.
- Providers in deficitIndependent providers
2035–36 91
Rising, unevenly: 78 in 2026–27, 91 in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- In deficit three years runningIndependent providers
2035–36 37
Falling: 52 in 2026–27, 37 in 2035–36, an improvement.
- At serious riskLow cash, or unable to pay their way
2035–36 30
Falling: 46 in 2026–27, 30 in 2035–36, an improvement.
- Merged since 2024–25Absorbed by another provider
2035–36 41
Rising: 1 in 2026–27, 41 in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- Closed since 2024–25Gone, with some students moving elsewhere
2035–36 12
Rising: 0 in 2026–27, 12 in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- Students who lost their placeContinuing students of closed providers not placed elsewhere, since 2024–25 (FTE)
2035–36 2,435
Rising: 0 in 2026–27, 2,435 in 2035–36, a deterioration.
- Home studentsFull-time equivalent
2035–36 1,578,000
Up and down: 1,586,000 in 2026–27, 1,578,000 in 2035–36, little overall change.
- International studentsFull-time equivalent
2035–36 491,000
Falling: 519,000 in 2026–27, 491,000 in 2035–36, not judged better or worse.
- Public-service studentsStudents now on medicine, nursing, health, teacher-training and social-work courses (all levels and domiciles), 2024–25 = 100
2035–36 102
Steady: 103 in 2026–27, 102 in 2035–36, little overall change.
Show the numbers, year by year
| Figure | 2026–27 | 2027–28 | 2028–29 | 2029–30 | 2030–31 | 2031–32 | 2032–33 | 2033–34 | 2034–35 | 2035–36 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial sustainabilityShare of students at providers not in a cash crisis, whether or not in deficit | 97% | 98% | 96% | 92% | 92% | 94% | 93% | 91% | 91% | 92% |
| Student experienceStaffing and estate, 2024–25 = 100 | 98 | 97 | 96 | 96 | 96 | 95 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 93 |
| Research capacityResearch activity, 2024–25 = 100 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 97 | 96 | 95 | 94 | 93 | 92 |
| Subject breadthCourses still offered, 2024–25 = 100 | 99 | 99 | 99 | 98 | 98 | 97 | 97 | 96 | 95 | 95 |
| Regional accessHome students at each region’s providers against its 18-year-olds, 2024–25 = 100 | 101 | 101 | 101 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Public costSelected: grants, research funding and the expected loss on fee loans, less the levy, in 2024–25 prices | £10.0bn | £10.0bn | £9.6bn | £9.6bn | £9.6bn | £9.5bn | £9.5bn | £9.3bn | £9.2bn | £9.0bn |
| Providers in deficitIndependent providers | 78 | 75 | 83 | 65 | 72 | 72 | 73 | 80 | 77 | 91 |
| In deficit three years runningIndependent providers | 52 | 36 | 35 | 29 | 34 | 33 | 33 | 28 | 34 | 37 |
| At serious riskLow cash, or unable to pay their way | 46 | 39 | 37 | 35 | 36 | 39 | 37 | 33 | 28 | 30 |
| Merged since 2024–25Absorbed by another provider | 1 | 3 | 8 | 13 | 16 | 17 | 21 | 28 | 33 | 41 |
| Closed since 2024–25Gone, with some students moving elsewhere | 0 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 12 |
| Students who lost their placeContinuing students of closed providers not placed elsewhere, since 2024–25 (FTE) | 0 | 0 | 402 | 1,646 | 1,646 | 1,646 | 1,646 | 1,813 | 2,108 | 2,435 |
| Home studentsFull-time equivalent | 1,586,000 | 1,607,000 | 1,624,000 | 1,636,000 | 1,652,000 | 1,662,000 | 1,660,000 | 1,641,000 | 1,613,000 | 1,578,000 |
| International studentsFull-time equivalent | 519,000 | 511,000 | 496,000 | 491,000 | 489,000 | 492,000 | 493,000 | 496,000 | 495,000 | 491,000 |
| Public-service studentsStudents now on medicine, nursing, health, teacher-training and social-work courses (all levels and domiciles), 2024–25 = 100 | 103 | 103 | 104 | 104 | 105 | 106 | 106 | 106 | 104 | 102 |